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ABSTRACT
Advocates of strong artificial intelligence believe
that properly programmed computers can go beyond the
simulation of intelligent acts so as to instantiate and
exhibit true intelligence, that is,
to that of man.

ln this thesis,

intelligence equivalent

I consider three problems

for strong-A!.
First, John Searle's well-known thought experiment of
the "Chinese Room" is used to reestablish the syntaxsemantics distinction and to show how this distinction
applies to computer programs.

I review the Chinese Room,

consider a variety of objections to it, and then expand on
the key points in Searle's work.
Second, 1 examine the Frame Problem in artificial
intelligence, a question made popular by Daniel Dennett.
Rational agents have the ability to adjust their conceptual
schemes and update their noetic web of beliefs so as to
maintain a representation of the world.

This ability is

easily observed but not well understood.
computers lack this

abil~ty

altogether.

I argue that
The Frame Problem

examines this deficiency and programming techniques designed
to overcome it.
Third, the Overseer problem examines the need for
artificial systems to have a rational agent in place who
designates a given task and determines when that task is
successfully completed by the system.

I argue that as long

as this need exists, artificial systems cannot be considered
intelligent in an unequivocal sense.
11
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INTRODUCTION
We are about to conceive of the hr1owet- as a comput.it19 machine.
Wan-en S. McCulloch, M.D.
"Tt-,r-ough the Den of the Meta.physician_.'' 1'i54
I am pt-epan:::d to go so fat- as to sa.y that within a. few yeat-s, lt thet-e r-emc:tin
ai·V philosopher-s who at-e not familiat- with some of the ma.it1 developments it1
art.ific:la.l. intelligence, it ·,·ill be fait- to a.ccu.se them c•f pt-ofessk•nal
inc()mpetet1Ce1 B.tid tt"ld.t. t.o t.ea.ch cour-ses in philosophy of mit1d, episte-

mology .•• without discussing .•• aspects of artificia.l int.elligence will be as
it-r-esponsible .;as givit19 a cow-se in physics which includes no quantum them-y.
Aan:w·1 Sloma.n
The Computet- Revolution iti Philosophy, 1978

Often in the history of philosophy, philosophers have
had to field concerns, questions, and claims from other
disciplines.

This is such a time.

Artificial intelligence,

once an obscure corner of computer science, raises questions
and makes claims that traditionally belong to the
epistemologist and metaphysician, to the philosopher of
language and mind, as well as the psychologist and neurophysiologist.

In this work,

I will examine some of the

philosophical concerns surrounding these claims.
I. The Problem
Let's start to outline the field of interest with some
terms.

The first is "strong artificial intelligence."

This

term names the position that, as Michael Arbib says, "AI
programs really could exhibit understanding or intelligence,
rather than simply simulate aspects of behaviors we construe
as intelligent when performed by a human being" (emphasis
mine).

1

"Weak AI" is similar to the former view although

weak AI is limited to simulation and makes no claims about
true machine intelligence.

I will use "Aiers" to designate
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supporters of strong-A!.
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"AI" itself is an elusive term to

define, but here are a couple of attempts by those in the
field:
AI is that pert of computet- science concen1ed with designing
it1telligent. computet- systems, i.e. systems that. e::-:hbit the
charact.et-istks which we a.ssc•ciate with intelliqence in human
behe.viour---e.g. utiderst.ar;ding language, lean1ing_, t-easc•r1ing_,
solvin·3 pr-oblems et.c. 2
(A system is artificially intelligent] if the +...asf~ [the system]
is ce.t-r-yiti9 out would r-equit-e intelligence if pet-for-med by
hu.mans. 3

Why is it that AI has been such a hot topic philosophically?

One reason is that philosophers perceive a major

misunderstanding of computer science claims at the popular
level.

This often happens when technical terms--in any

field, not just computer science--are imported back into
popular writing.

Another reason lies in the sometimes

outlandish claims of Aiers that reach far beyond their field.
Consider for example this scenario envisioned by CarnegieMellon researcher Hans Moravec.

One day all knowledge and

skills will be stored in computers and "down-loaded" to
people whenever they require such expertise.
This will r-esult in a gt-adua.l 1?n:•sim1 of itidividue.lity_, at1d
fot-matiot1 of an incredibly potent community. • • • [Which '#ill
be] constar1t.l)l impt-ovit-:g BY1d e::-::tending itself, spn=::ading
outwan:!s ft-om the solar- system, cm1verting t1on-life it1to
mind. . . • This pr-ocess_, possibly occu.t-r-ing now elsewher-e_,
might convet-t the entir-e univer-se into an e::-::t.ended thinking
et1t.ity.4

If a philosopher or theologian made such claims, he would not
be taken very seriously.
Let's examine strong-A! more closely.

"Intelligent
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behavior" is picked out, somewhat intuitively, and identified
with those acts carried out by humans that artifacts
(normally) cannot carry

out.~

Computers can be made to act

intelligently via rule-governed symbol manipulation (i.e.,
they are programmed).
symbol shuffler.
description,

The digital computer is a systematic

That is, at one level of computational

l's and O's are moved to the right place at the

right time according to the hardware restraints and the
software instruction.

At a deeper level, transistors are

systematically turned on and off,

The program determines the

rules by which these manipulations will occur.

According to

this "rules-and-representations" view CRR), humans also must
or might (there is a spectrum of opinion here) produce
intelligent behavior through an internal set of rules.
Supporters of RR point to logic and language as paradigm
cases of rule governedness that would require such mental
symbols.

Both humans and computers would, therefore,

comprise a larger class of "information processing systems."
Although the RR view does not apply to all branches of
computer science,

it has dominated the AI community for the

past twenty years.

Strong AI working under the RR model is

now called classic or "good-old-fashioned-A!" (GOFAI, coined
by John Haugeland).
Traditionally optimism runs high in GOFAI.

Herbert

Simon of Carnegie-Mellon University claims that literally
thinking machines now exist.

In fact, these machines have

Koperski
thoughts in the strictest sense of the term.•

Alan Newell,

Simon's long-time associate, claims that intelligence just
physical symbol manipulation.

4

~

If machines manipulate the

symbols in the "right way," the machines should embody
intelligence in precisely the same sense as humans.

7

In a

paper by both Simon and Newell they write,
Then? at-e tiOW in the wm-ld machines that think, that. learn and
tha.t. ct-eate. Mm-eover-, their- ability to do these things is
going to inct-ease t-apidly Ut1til--it1 the visible futut-e--the
nmge of pn:•blems they can handle will be cc•e>=:tensive with the
r-atige to which the human mind has beet1 a.pplied.6

Marvin Minsky of MIT, perhaps the most important thinker in
AI, thinks that humans might be reduced to household pets by
the next generation of computers. 9

Finally, John McCarthy,

inventor of the term "artificial intelligence," says the
"ascription of mental qualities is most straightforward for
machines of known structure such as thermostats and computer
operating systems.

II

l. (:)

For example, your furnace

thermostat has at least three beliefs:
too cold,

it's just right.

it' s too hot,

it' s

These are a few of the more

celebrated opinions found in GOFAI circles.
II. General Outline
The subject matter discussed so far is both broad and
deep enough to take in many directions.

I will focus on

three, one per chapter.
Chapter 1 will deal with the syntax-semantics
distinction--actually the failure to maintain this
distinction.

AI critics argue that at the core of any

Koperski
digital computer system is a network of switches.

5

The on-off

manipulations (even the l's and O's in the machine code) are
purely syntactic:
governed way.

tokens are shuffled around in a rule-

Aiers counter that at the system level (i.e,

the system-as-a-whole), complex rule-governed behavior allows
for the emergence of semantic content:
meaning.

the tokens will have

John Searle's "Chinese Room" thought-experiment

will serve as the pivotal example through which to address
this problem.

I will argue,

in agreement with Searle, that

syntax is never sufficient for semantics, although the
Chinese Room example is not without its shortcomings.
Chapter 2 will focus on what some believe to be an
insurmountable epistemic problem for the RR view, viz., the
Frame Problem.

In short, the frame problem is the computer's

inability to abstract (what we consider to be) important
details from common experience and to then use this
information to guide its future behavior.

I will argue that

the frame problem is not another technical difficulty to be
overcome in time, but rather that the classic RR model is
inadequate to handle this difficulty.

AI is quite possibly

in the midst of a paradigm shift because of the chronic
failure to overcome this problem and because of the early
successes of a rival model.
As Thomas Kuhn has shown, to have a paradigm shift,
there must be a rival paradigm.

In Chapter 3 I will briefly

present some key aspects of the rival "connectionist"

Koperski
approach.

6

The main topic of the chapter is to present yet

another difficulty, what I will call the Overseer Problem,
that affects not only GOFAI computers, but the new
connectionist systems as well.
III. An Important Qualification
Equivocating over technical-operational and popular
terms has a long and glorious history in AI.

Some in the

artificial intelligentsia purposefully deny that there is any
equivocation.

McCarthy provides a key example:

To asct-ibe cer-tain "beliefs", "hnowledge", "ft-ee:~ will",
"ititentions", "consciousness", "abilities" or "wa.nt.s" to
a ma.chit·te m- computet- pn:•gt-am is legj.timat.e when such art
aschption e::<pt-esses the sa.me infon11at.ion atu:.ut. the machit1e
that it e::·q:•n'?sses a.bout. a pet-son. 11

Here

i~

a clear case where the metaphorical use of

anthropomorphic terms has ceased to be metaphorical.

I see

nothing wrong with using mental terms to describe the
behavior and function of various computer operations;
however, we must realize that such ascriptions are (usually)
intended as analogies only.

For example, one might describe

a chess-playing computer as believing that its king is in
trouble.

In fact, the computer "believes" nothing nor does

it have any conception of "king" or "chess" for that matter.
The computer is simply executing the commands it has been
programmed to carry out.

Mental terms used in this analogous

way are (or at least were) useful shorthands in denoting a
given behavior.
In Section I of his paper "Artificial Intelligence
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Meets Natural Stupidity," Drew McDermott explains that
programmers sometimes become entranced by their own "wishful
mnemonics.

"

1

:;;~.

McDermott shows how a suggestive subroutine

like UNDERSTAND, GOAL, or ASSERT might get its name before
the programmer knows if his algorithm has any chance of
simulating what's being named.
If [the pt-ogr-ammer-J calls the ma.in loop of his pt-ogt-am
'UNDERSTAND'_, he is (until pr-oven innocent) met-ely begging the
quest.i•:.r·i. He may mislea.d .:;; lot of peQple, most. pn:.minent.ly
himself_, and et1t-age a. lot of othet-s. What he should do it1st.ee.d
is t-efer- to this ma.in loop as '!3003!t' and see if he can
•;;:ptwince himself ot- anyone else that !30034 implements some
par-t of under-st.::.tiding.13

Such oversights ultimately hurt the AI field.

Slogans

and buzz words, especially when used outside of a technical
context, have come to confuse more than clarify.
With this danger plainly in view, such metaphorical
terms still have heuristic value.

As long as the metaphor is

clearly noted, using "learns," "sees," etc., to describe
computer behavior

~

a useful shorthand.

Thus the reader is

warned up front that my use of anthropomorphic terms in this
manner in _no way endorses a reduction of any kind.

With this

qualification firmly established, let's enter the Chinese
Room.

Koperski
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CHAPTER 1
SYNTAX, SEMANTICS, AND SEARLE
For- Seade.• ititentiOt"!ality is t-athet- m~.e a WC•ndet-ful substance sect-et.ed by the
bt-ain the way the pancr-eas seo-etes insulin. Bt-aitis pt-oduce intentionality. he
sa.ys, whet-eas othet- objects, such a.s •:c•mputet- pt-ogt-ams, cko n:•t. . • , Luddly
fm- us ••• out- bt-aitlS maJ.;e intentionality; if they didn~t we'd behave .just as
we now do, but of cout-se we wouldn't mean it!
Datliel Dennett
"The Milk of Human It1tentim1ality," 1'780
Thet-e is a tendency in AI today t.c•wat-ds flashy, splashy doma.ins. • • • Yet
ther-e is tlo pt-ogt-am that has common sense; no pr-ogro:tm that lean1s things that
it has tlot been e::·::plicitly been taught how to lean1••..
Dou·3las H:•fstadtet"At-t.ificia.l It-,telligence: Subcogtlition as Computa.tion," 1'783

In the twentieth century, the philosophy of language
has become a hotly contested sub-discipline.

Regardless of

one's position, all agree that many helpful distinctions have
been made.

The distinction I will focus on in this chapter

causes little controversy until computer intelligence comes
into play.

This is the distinction between syntax and

semantics.
Syntax is the realm of symbols (tokens) and their
proper manipulation.

1

Syntactic rules tell us "what counts":

which tokens are allowed and in what order they are to be
recognized.

For example, among the specified tokens in

arithmetic we have '1',

'2',

'3',

'+', and

'='

In first

grade we learn that '2 + 1 = 3' is an allowable string of
arithmetic tokens whereas

'2 1 +

= 3' is not.

The symbols

are arbitrary, of course, e.g., we know that '1 + 8
the same as 'I + VIII = IX'

in Roman numerals.

= 9' is

But what do
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we mean by "is the same as?"
To answer this question, we enter the realm of
semantics.

The Arabic and Roman numerals are the same in the

sense that we assign the same semantic content to '8',
'VIII', and 'eight'.

Tokens themselves lack. semantic
Tokens only have meaning when

content; they are meaningless.
they are interpreted.

Computers are syntactic engines.

In the introduction,

we saw that they manipulate symbols according to the rules of
a given program.

Aiers (recall this designates strong-A!, RR

enthusiasts) claim that syntactic rules can be of sufficient
complexity when embodied in a computer program so that a
computer can go beyond simple syntax and actually understand
the commands being executed.

That is, given a sufficiently

rich syntactic program code, the computer will provide
semantic content to its symbols.

Under the RR model of

cognition, we do much the same thing--people have an internal
syntax that produces our semantics.
John Searle's main criticism of this view is simple:
Thet-e is a. distinction between manipulatit19 the syntactical
elemer:ts of la.nguage and actually under-standing the language
at a. semantic level. What is k•st in the AI simulation of
cc•gnitive behaviour- is the distinction between syr:ta::< and
semantics.2

Searle's thought-experiment illustrates that manipulating
symbols according to a list of rules will never produce
understanding in the mechanism--biological or mechanical-executing the rules.

In short, syntax is never sufficient

Koperski
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for semantics.
I. Searle's Chinese Room: The Argument
The experiment runs as follows CI will put myself in
Searle's role).

3

Imagine I am in a small room with baskets

full of Chinese language characters.

It is important to note

that I do not understand Chinese in the least--the characters
are just different tokens to me.

I have been provided with a

rule book, written in English (which I obviously understand),
with instructions for matching these symbols with other
symbols.

I use the term 'symbol' here under the assumption

that these tokens symbolize something to someone.

The rules

in the book govern the manipulation of the symbols by their
shape alone; no translations or meanings are provided.
Outside the room, native Chinese people have access to two
slots,

In and Out, and have no idea what's going on inside.

They slip pieces of paper with Chinese characters through the
In slot and I match these symbols with those specified by the
rule book.

The book instructs which symbols to then pick out

of the baskets and send through the Out slot.
Unbeknownst to me, the people outside are putting
questions, not just random symbols,

in the In slot and, from

their point of view, answers to these questions are coming
through the Out slot.

This exchange is exactly what the

writers of the rule book intended.

These "answers" to

"questions" are in perfect Chinese syntax and obey standard
Chinese semantic rules.

As far as the Chinese are concerned,

Koperski
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whoever is in the room seems to understand their language.
But I do not understand Chinese.
The analogy to a digital computer lines up this way.
The rule book. corresponds to a computer program written in
whatever artificial language you lik.e (e.g., LISP, the
traditional language for AI).

The rule book. writers are the

programmers, the only one's who k.now what's going on inside
and outside the room.
base.

The baskets of symbols are a data

I am the computer, or perhaps specifically the CPU.

The In slot serves as an input terminal and the Out slot is a
printer.
The thrust of the argument is really quite simple:
If I do tiot undet-st.and Chinese solely on the basis c•f n_tnt1iti9 a
computet- pn)gt-a.m fot- undet-st.an•jing Chinese .• then r,eithet- does
any othet- digita.l computet- solely on that basis. Digital
computet-s met-ely ma.nipulate for-mal symbols acc.:.njing to t-u.les
in the pn:.gt-a.m.4

We may break. the argument down this way:
a is able to execute a list of rules that simulates the
understanding of language L to some observer a.
a does not understand L.
Therefore the execution of a list of rules is not
sufficient for a to understand L.
II. The Chinese Room: Application
The thought-experiment is intriguing and for the most
part uncontroversial as it stands.

Of course, Searle uses

the Chinese Room as a launching pad for a more elaborate
argument consisting specifically of four premises (P) and
four conclusions

(C).~

CPl) Brains cause minds.

This premise is unnecessary

Koperski
and serves primarily to affirm Searle's physicalism.
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The

mind is viewed here as a higher order property of the brain
(higher, that is, than say its greyness or solidity).

Searle

might agree with Minsky's belief that "minds are what brains
do"; however, Searle strives to preserve the concept of mind
from hasty reductions, especially those of the eliminative
materialist.•

Except for this premise, as Sir John Eccles

points out, Searle's argument could easily come from a
dualist in the philosophy of mind.

7

CP2) Syntax is not sufficient for semantics.
course, strong-A! calls this begging the question.

Of
The RR

model claims precisely that semantics will be found to be a
property of a sufficiently rich syntax.

The Chinese Room is

meant to emphasize (and perhaps reestablish) P2.
CP3) Computer programs are purely formal (syntactic).
There is no fundamental reason for programs to be run only on
digital computers since the program itself only specifies
syntactic manipulations.

The symbols at the machine code

level Cl's and O's, on and off) are wholly abstract and can
be assigned to any rule-governed system:

water pipes,

control relays, or, according to Searle, "old beer cans
strung together with wires and powered by windmills.''
P3 in mind;

Keep

it will become important later on.

CP4) tlinds have mental contents; specifically, they
have semantic contents.

This premise Searle takes as self-

evident and all of cognitive science assumes it.

The cause,

Koperski
not the fact, of semantic content is controversial.
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Searle

now moves to his conclusions.
(Cl) No computer program by itself is sufficient to
give a system a mind.

Programs, in short, are not minds and

they are not by themselves sufficient for causing minds.

The

only things we know that cause minds, at this point, are
brains.

Some mental activities (e.g., logic) can obviously

be simulated by computers, so in a (trivial?) sense minds can
be described computationally.

However, simulated "thinking"

via computational symbol manipulation does not imply that
thinking is identical to symbol manipulation.
(C2) The way that brain functions cause minds cannot be
solely in virtue of running a computer program (Pl + Cl).
This strikes at heart of the RR model.

No matter what kind

of internal syntax the RR might claim we have,

it will never

be rich enough to explain our semantic behavior.
(C3) Anything else that caused minds would have to have
causal powers at least equivalent to those of the brain.

The

opacity of the term 'causal powers' will attract critics en
masse.

This problem will be examined in the next section.
(C4) For any artifact that we might build that had

mental states equivalent to human mental states, the
implementation of a computer program would not by itself be
sufficient for those mental states.

Searle does not deny the

possibility of synthetic intelligence, just that such
intelligence will not simply implement a formal program.

Why

Koperski
not?

Because any formal rules put into the system could,
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principle, be followed by a human without understanding what
the program is about.

C4 is perhaps simply a corollary of

Cl.
III. Facing the Critics
In the last ten years, Searle has become one of the
most
prominent philosopher-critics of GOFAI.

Not surprisingly,

the Chinese Room has drawn fire from all corners of cognitive
science.

In this section,

I will examine some of these

criticisms and offer possible replies.

I assume that Searle

would agree with these replies to his critics, since some of
these he offers himself, but I cannot guarantee this across
the board.
A. "Causal Powers" [C3]:

What does this mean?

Many

critics wonder aloud what these causal powers might be.
Searle leaves his explanation at a rather intuitive level
saying only that physical systems do not exhibit
intentionality--at least not yet.

However, as a physicalist,

Searle cannot call on a mind or soul to serve as the
metaphysical seat of either agent causality or intentions.
Other physicalists want a material analysis of these causal
powers, and rightly so.
Reply.

Whatever they are, the brain's causal powers

are more than just the ability to execute the next rule in a
syntactic code, which is all the symbols in a program can do.
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Without question, we do need science to help uncover the
nature of these causal powers of the brain, but the causal
powers of l's and O's are already well understood: they are
abstract symbol carriers only.

Furthermore, whether a

machine has these causal powers is an empirical question.
How so?

Recall Searle has no theoretical objections to the

possibility of synthetic intelligence (see C4), thus machines
with causal powers might be invented someday.e

The point is,

instantiating a program is not sufficient to provide such
machines with causal powers.

It is this syntactic insuf-

ficiency that the Chinese Room is directed against, not the
possibility of man-made intelligence.
I agree with Searle's critics that "causal power" is a
very opaque term that invites abuse.

If such powers are

empirically testable, as Searle claims,

it would help if he

provided at least an outline for the criteria we might employ
to find them.

Without any empirical guidelines, such causal

powers remain quite mysterious and out of place for a
physicalist.

In fact,

intentionality and agent causation are

traditionally called on by dualists to criticize reductive
theories in the philosophy of mind.

Critics rightly sense

that these elements are difficult to mak.e coherent in a
physicalist system.
B. Counterexample: Haugeland's Demon

CH-demon).~

In

trying to nail down Searle's application of causal powers,
John Haugeland has proposed this counterexample.

Consider

Koperski
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person a who has been struck with a rare disease such that
his brain's neurotransmitters no longer send signals from
neuron to neuron.

We install in a's brain an H-demon that

"tickles the appropriate synapse of the next neuron in a way
that is functionally indistinguishable, to that neuron, from
the arrival of genuine neurotransmitters.'' 1 0

The demon is so

quick that it never falls behind and a's brain continues to
function.

The question for Searle is, does this brain still

have intentionality (and therefore causal powers)?
Reply.

Searle does not back down:

"[a's) neurons

still have the right causal powers; they just need help from
the demon.'' 11

That is,

if the H-demon can reproduce the

activity within the brain as if it were working properly,
then yes, the causal powers are maintained and so is intentionality.
Searle's critics do not like this reply since it only
slightly firms up the notion of causal powers.

The empirical

criterion asked for seems to be simply "x has causal powers
iff x is a working brain."

I believe, however, that Searle's

reply is consistent with his main point against GOFAI.

Note

that the H-demon does not follow a set of rules (e.g., a
computer program) to keep a's brain going.

This new demon-

brain system might be semi-artificial or synthetic (thus
possibly intentional, see last reply), but as long as the
demon-brain operates by a means other than rule execution,
the H-demon is not an example of strong-A!.

Therefore this
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is not a counterexample to the Chinese Room.
C. The Systems Reply.

This criticism comes from both

computer and neuro-science.

In short it says, "You do not

understand Chinese, but the room as a whole does."

The

Chinese Room is not complete if we just focus on me, the guy
inside.

The room is also data banks of symbols plus the rule

book. plus scratch pads.
the system, not just me.

Understanding is ascribed to
As Haugeland puts it, "the system

as a whole manipulates the tokens in ways appropriate to what
they mean, with no intervention from outside users; and
that's semantic activity." 1 :d!.

Searle confuses different

levels of description and attribution.
Dennett, for example,
doesn't.

"

1

·::!!'

"l

According to Daniel

understand English;

[my] brain

No one wants to ascribe understanding to

the computer's CPU.

Searle is simply looking too deep.

If

the system exhibits semantic activity, then at the system
level we can ascribe understanding to it.
Reply.

System level ascription does not escape the

syntactic-semantic distinction:

"[If] I, as the central

processing unit, have no way of figuring out what any of
these symbols mean;
system." 1· 4

That is,

[then] neither does the whole
if I don't understand the Chinese

symbols, then no matter how many useful things you throw in
with me, the room doesn't understand either.
Consider a counterexample, suggested by Searle.
memorize the rule book. and the symbols in the baskets.

I
The
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I can now apparently

read and write Chinese, but the question is whether I
understand Chinese the same way I understand English.
Clearly I do not.

I am following the rules I have memorized

for dealing with Chinese characters, but I still don't know
what they mean, "Whereas the English subsystem knows that
'hamburger' refers to hamburgers, the Chinese subsystem knows
only that 'squiggle squiggle'
squoggle • . "H.•

is followed by 'squoggle

The key difference again rests on what I, as a

knowing subject, self-reflectively understand or do not
understand.

No outside observer can unerringly make this

judgment.
D. Faulty Model of the Mind-Brain.
criticism has many versions,

Although this

I will focus on Marvin Minsky's:

I dm1't mea.n to sa.y that bt-ains or minds are simple; bt-a.it1S at-e
immensely comple::< machines--at1d so at-e wha.t. they do•••
Whenevet- we speaJ.; a.bout. a mitid, we't-e n::ferdng to the
pt-ocesses that. move out- bt-a.itis ft-om st.ate to state.1 '-"

Minsky's point is closely related to the usual criticisms
about folk psychology.

That is, most or all of the events

named by prescientific mental terms,

including Searle's

"intentionality" and "causal powers," are simply the result
of a highly complex, physical process.

Eventually these

prescientific terms will be reduced or replaced by a mature
mind science.

Searle's analysis forces us to give credence

to opaque terms derived from our own limited introspection.
Before we say what computers can or cannot understand, let's
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first allow neuroscience and AI to run their course so we
really know what's going on.
Reply. Searle's reply continues on the same theme.

A

fully mature neurophysiology with precise scientific jargon
will not erase the difference between a belief ascribed to an
artifact and a belief had by a person.

17

For the sake of

scientific research, one can certainly put humans, computers,
and thermostats on a relative "belief continuum."

But the

point Searle comes back. to again and again is that our
ascriptions cannot change the real, first-person, qualitative
difference between a machine's behavior and our experience.
The gulf between my knowing Chinese and behaving as if I know
Chinese cannot be bridged by a new scientific description of
the process.
E. Misleading Analogy.

The Chinese Room gives the

impression that the subject is doing the equivalent of
manipulating an AI program by hand.

16

The reader is led to

identify with Searle's "feeling the lack of understanding
Chinese."

But human execution of a complex language program

made for a digital computer would take years!
mention this and for good reason.

Searle doesn't

If the question-and-answer

transaction with the Chinese people outside the room took
years, the questioners would no longer believe anyone in the
room understood Chinese.

Once this time factor is revealed,

Searle's intuitive link with the reader fails and so does the
thought-experiment.

Koperski
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The responses to this problem are concise and
First, we could replace the man in the room with

Haugeland's H-demon, which is very fast.

Hand manipulating

the program now is on par with a computer.

But when we ask

the (English speaking) H-demon if he understands Chinese, we
get the same result as before.
a criterion for intelligence?

Second, when did speed become
How fast someone solves a

problem or thinks about a question might be a measure of his
intelligence, but time is not a factor in determining whether
a subject is intelligent.

Bringing in a speed element is ad

hoc.
F.

Intuition pump.
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For those already sympathetic to

the strong-A! side, this is possibly the most damaging
criticism.

Unfortunately for Searle, his entire "argument"

is nothing but an intuition pump.

He doesn't really assert

anything, but Searle gets the reader to nod his head in
agreement and say to h imse 1 f, "Yea, he's right.

I would

surely know whether I understood Chinese are not."
to Ned Block, Searle has a hidden premise:
suff ic lent to overrule the 1 ntu1 t ions. " 2

'::>

According

"Evidence isn't
After a 11, our

intuitions once told us Earth is stationary, large objects
fall faster than small, etc.

When evidence is introduced,

our intuitions must conform.

Searle is unfair in two ways.

First, he acts like evidence is at the mercy of intuition.
Second, he does not deal with any of the evidence for the AI
side.

Such hand-waving over the successes of the field
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should not be tolerated.
Reply.

'Intuition' is used here in an equivocal way.

On one hand, one's intuitions (i.e., thoughts or opinions)
about the goings on in the Chinese Room are irrelevant.

The

point of the illustration is to emphasize a conceptual truth
that is usually well understood:

syntax is not semantics.

The Chinese Room attempts to recapture the idea that
shuffling uninterpreted formal symbols is not the same as
understanding their meaning.

On the other hand,

'intuition'

has an epistemic sense regarding one's first-person
experience of a situation.

I know intuitively (i.e.,

directly and with certainty) that I don't understand Chinese.
This use is different from the popular use of 'intuitive
insight' as in "women's intuition."

The second use of

'intuition' is what Searle appeals to in most of his replies.
No third-person observer can have a subject's direct, firstperson intuition that the subject does or does not understand
a given symbol.
In conclusion, Searle's critics often try to take the
Chinese Room beyond the very limited scope intended.

In

almost every case, the reply refocuses the discussion on the
key issues of syntax-semantics and first-person understanding
(or lack of understanding).

These are the conceptual pillars

Searle is trying to save from a behavioral reduction.
IV. Beyond the Chinese Room
Why is it that the Chinese Room invokes so much
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The

computer science successes brought about by the RR model are
thought to be a decisive blow against anyone (especially
bothersome philosophers) who relies solely on non-empirical
arguments.

Although complete brain simulation might be a

technological impossibility, under the RR theory there is no
physical impossibility preventing the brain's rule-governed
activity from being captured by a program.

If we could only

discover the correct rules and if we had a medium of
sufficient complexity, Aiers claim, we would have
unequivocal, non-metaphorical, artificial intelligence.
In this section,

I will present an adaptation of the

Chinese Room to try to determine where the line is drawn on
the application of the RR model (i.e., what is it that we may
call intelligent?).

RR enthusiasts will likely object that

my application is not what they intended their criteria to be
used for; however, the thought-experiment is a well
established device to determine where a theory might lead.
A. Another Thought Experiment.

As I was studying one

morning, a small robot crawled into my room, handed me a
book, and promptly disappeared.

The book (copyright 2025)

contained the history of AI research.
engineers at IBM-Xerox,

Inc.

In the year 2020,

invented (i.e., will invent) the

UBS (Ultimate Brain Simulation) program.

UBS was run on a

highly advanced optic-digital computer, the CRAY-7.

With

speed and memory many orders of magnitude higher than in
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previous decades, UBS on the CRAY-7 can produce any semantic
behavior desired.

According to the now mature RR model of

cognition, the CRAY-7 instantiates true intelligence.
In 2021, Ed, an electrical engineer who dabbled in
necromancy, got a copy of UBS but decided not to run it on
the CRAY-7.

A formal program, after all, has no intrinsic

preference for what physical apparatus carries it out.
In Ed's wizardly experiments, he learned to conjure up
a small demon (much like the H-demon described earlier).
This H-demon is not only quick but transdimensional,
"blinking" in and out of any location instantaneously.

Ed

teaches the H-demon to leave flashlights at every planet and
moon in the galaxy.

Ed decides to run UBS on a galactic

scale.
Impossible?

As I mentioned in the introduction, at a

deep level of description a digital computer is a system of
electronic switches that are either on or off, depending on
the program instruction.

Theoretically, any medium that can

keep track of two physical states (on and off) can carry out
a program.
Ed teaches the demon to read the UBS code and switch
the flashlights on-off as the code instructs. 21

The demon

periodically checks with Ed for any new commands
("interrupts" in computer jargon).
Now if running UBS instantiates true human-level
intelligence, should we expect the CRAY-7, and now the galaxy
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itself, to have beliefs, perhaps an idea of "self," and even
free will?

What criteria would we apply?

The philo-

sophically interesting question the galactic brain experiment
points to is,

If intelligence is a property,

to count as candidates for intelligence, x?

I, what are we
Since persons

(a) are intelligent--the paradigm case if you will--certainly
the variable x can be replaced with the name of any person,
Ia (read "a is intelligent").

Aiers also want to substitute

certain computers (c) that meet the RR criteria for
intelligence,

Ic.

Now we have another medium that meets the

RR criteria; but does anyone want to count the galaxy (g) as
a candidate for intelligence,

Ig?

What criterion in the RR

model allows Ia and Ic but disallows Ig?
B. Trying to Fix RR.

There are none.

There are two possible criteria

to
limit the domain of x.
brain is too slow:

First, Aiers could argue the galactic

Ix only if x is fast.

This rule is

derived from the fact that semantic behavior is not
observable from a system that takes months or years to reply
to an inquiry.

The problem with this criterion is that the

RR model does not consider speed.

Adding a time qualifier is

clearly an ad hoc fix, but let's allow it for now.
The galactic brain could still meet the new criteria.
Instead of one H-demon blinking around space, Ed conjures up
trillions of H-demons.

Better still, Ed discovers that

demons have trans-dimensional sight.

He puts one H-demon per
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flashlight so each demon can read the program code on Earth
and also see the other lights going on/off,

Speed would then

approach the new requirements.
The second new criterion possible is spatial
localization:

Ix only if x is spatially localized.

undeniably non-local, but this fix fails as well.
the standard for localization?

g is
What is

On a human scale, g is not

localized; on a universal scale, g is very localized (i.e., g
is not undeniably non-local).
one is another ad hoc fix.

Like the speed objection, this

I cannot alter the galactic brain

to fit this time, but such subjective standards tend to
weaken the strong-A! case.
I believe the "what counts" problem for the object of
predicate I runs throughout the Chinese Room debate.
Consider three levels of use for mental terms,
intelligence.

including

Level one (Ll) is the neural level.

Many

believe Ll is where we find the sufficient conditions for
semantic behavior.
personal level:

Neuro-science focuses here.

L2 is the

the common use of mental terms has to do

with people, not neural interactions.

Psychology focuses on

L2 while AI picks and chooses between Ll and L2.

There is

also an L3 at the level of corporate objects like nations and
companies.

We say things like "General Motors loves its

customers" and "the United States wants all foreign
governments.

II

Pure reductionists want to dispel with L2 and L3.
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Prereflectively, everyone agrees that attributing mental
properties or actions to corporate objects is highly
metaphorical.

Reductionists go further to say mentalistic

terms used in folk. psychology are lik.ewise non-technical and
confusing and will eventually be replaced by scientific terms
(see Minsk.y above).

We should disregard the upper levels of

mental description in favor of what's "really" going on:
neural interaction.
The more common view is to agree with the reductionist
about corporate objects, but reject the wholesale reduction
of L2 to Ll.

Mental terms lik.e 'belief' and 'intention' are

not sufficiently captured or explained by neural phenomena.
This is the position of Searle and substance dualists.zz
C. Operationalism.

There is a shadowy middle ground

between reductionism. and folk. psychology that sometimes goes
unrecognized in the AI debate.

This territory is held by

operationalismJ an approach to the philosophies of mind and
science that will become very important in chapter 3.

The

operationalists hold that L2 terms (beliefs, desires, etc.)
are useful and should not be reduced to Ll terms.

This

differs with Searle and the dualists in that, although
useful, L2 terms for the operationalist have no more
ontological weight than L3, the corporate-mental terms.
Here is an example by Dennett.

Consider terms used by

loggers in Maine:
You ca.n ft.t-id\' an a.pple t.t-ee uTr.:.o fthinf\ing it's spr-ing' by
building a small fit-e Ut1det- its br-anches in the late fall:; it will
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blossc•tT;. This way of talking is nc•t .just picturesque a.t1d is
nc•t t-eally supet-st.it.ious at all.; it is simply an efficient way
of making sense of, cor1trolling, pt-e dieting.. a.nd e::·::plaining the
behavior- of these plants in a way t.ha.t. t1icely cin:u.mvents one's
ignm-a.nce of the contn:•lling mechanisms.23

12 is especially needed when a system becomes too
complex to predict its behavior in 11 terms.

That is,

it ' s

fine to talk. about a robot "wanting to go outside" (12) when
an explanation in terms of program code and electronics is
too long or complex.

'Wanting' conveys the idea adequately.

An alternative use of mental terms is seen in the
programmer who starts with 12 and works his way to 11.

In a

chess program, for example, the programmer wants to mak.e the
computer protect-the-king.

The notion of protect-the-king

must then be translated down to the 11 program code level to
mak.e the system perform the 12 behavior.

12 is not a property of the system, rather 12 reflects
our stance or attitude toward the system. 2

"'•

Note that

operationalists in AI are usually operational only with
respect to 12 and 13 and scientific realists regarding 11.

12 has heuristic, predictive value only and has nothing to do
with the nature of the system under investigation--man or
machine.

11 is where real explanations are found.

Why is operationalism important here?

I mention this

approach because operationalists use mental terms much lik.e
Searle or a dualist would use them.

For the latter two,

however, 12 has more than just heuristic value.

12 for

Searle says something about the system itself, not just how
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The AI debate is about whether a system

really is intelligent or has desires.

Operationalism does

little to help answer this question, but might sound to the
unwary reader as if it does.
V. Epistemology and Attribution
Some of the confusion over the Chinese Room could be
eliminated if all the participants would maintain a
consistent epistemic relationship to the system being
discussed.

That is, critics often alter their epistemic

position without warning the reader.

By 'epistemic position'

CEP) I mean the relationship between an agent and a state of
affairs whereby the agent is justified in holding certain
beliefs about that state of affairs.
I'm sure an example would be useful.

Say I am in my

study and I come to the belief p that my wife is doing
cartwheels in the living room.

Now I have no evidence for

this, thus p is unjustified given my epistemic position
(which coincidentally corresponds to my physical location).
If however,

I go into the hall and see my wife's shadow

flipping all about and hear the crash of a lamp on the floor,
my epistemic position has changed.
fication for p.

I now have some justi-

It is important to note that epistemic

position does not affect the truth of any belief.
justified in a belief and still be wrong.

This last point is

simply the well-known distinction between truth and
justification.

I can be
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only have access to the IN/OUT slots of the room.
epistemic position EPl.
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Call their

Given the apparent replies they

receive to their questions, those at EPl are justified in
believing pl

= 'someone inside the room understands Chinese'.

Those in the strong-A! camp argue that we are in an
analogous EP to those at EPl when we approach a highly
sophisticated computer system.

That is, given the system's

= 'the

semantic behavior, we are justified in believing p2

computer understands z' where z is the subject matter of the
program (e.g., chess).

Just like the Chinese people, we have

behavioral evidence that the computer understands what it is
doing.

p2 might be false,

but given our EP, we may rightly

attribute intelligence to certain intricate systems.

Or so

the argument goes.
Let's go back to the Chinese Room.

Say one of the

Chinese doesn't like the answer he received and takes a
sledge hammer to the OUT slot.

The window breaks revealing

Searle with his rule book and baskets of symbols.

As the

Chinese begin to investigate, they come to realize that
Searle doesn't understand a bit of Chinese; he's just doing
what his rule book tells him.

Now their EP has changed from

EPl to EP2 given the new evidence.

At EP2, they are no

longer justified in believing pl.
The key to Searle's experiment is that we are not in an
analogous epistemic position to EPl with respect to complex
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We know exactly

rule-governed symbol manipulation

following the instructions of a well-defined computer code.
We can get beyond the behavior of the system down to how the
(apparent) semantic activity has been

generated.

2~

An anticipated reply to this analysis of EP comes from
the classic "other minds" problem in philosophy.
briefly considers this himself,z•

Searle

I can't know with

certainty that anyone else has a mind (or consciousness or
intelligence, etc.) like I know that I have a mind.

Everyone

else could be an android controlled by Descartes' evil
genius.

From my EP, all the evidence available to me for

believing you have a mind is your behavior.

Why not use the

same behavioral criteria for a computer?
In reply, note that the AI criticism short-changes us
on the available evidence.

The criteria I use to infer that

others have minds is based on our similar behavior in similar
situations, but behavior is not the only thing we have in
common.

There are both behavioral and physical similarities

to consider, specifically,

I and other humans share a close

neurophysiological similarity that I do not share with
computers.

This commonality is the backbone of Richard

Swinburne's principles of charity and credulity used to deal
with the other-minds objection (see his Evolution of the Soul
pp. 13-17 for a detailed analysis).

The problem with

attributing a mind or intelligence to a computer is our
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At present,

neuroscience is not mature enough to say how far the notion
of intelligence can be removed from the only paradigm case
available:

human brains.

Swinburne points out that,

It. would be diffet-et1t if •.p~e had a well-justified gener-al theor-y
Ctf CC!t1SCiousr-JeSS "
that e::·::pi.::titied which physical pt-S:tCesses
of kir,ds O:UtTer1t.l.y u.r-,~mown give r-ise tc. which met1tal
ever1ts. • . • Then we could e::-::amir1e the t1at-t.ian.s and 1·-obot.s to
see whether- their- ph)!Sical pn:.cesses wen? c•f a chat-actet- to
give dse to menteJ events, i.e. wer-e similar to our own in
whatever- r-espects the theor-y had identified a.s cr-ucial forZf

"

t.his"27

In lieu of such a comprehensive mind-theory, our EP
allows us to conclude only that beings with both behavior and
physiology like ourselves are intelligent.
earlier discussion,

In terms of the

Ix is limited to x's that are human, at

least for the time being. 2 6

If behavior were all we had to

go on to judge whether a given computer is intelligent, then
our EP would allow for the attribution of intelligence.

But

we are not so limited.
VI. Conclusion
Neither Swinburne (a dualist) nor Searle (a
physicalist)
objects to theoretical synthetic intelligence.

The point of

the Chinese Room is that whatever form this synthetic
intelligence takes,
rules.

it will not simply instantiate formal

It must affix semantic content as well.

cognitive model of AI, the RR model,

The driving

is inadequate for true

intelligence, since it maintains that syntactic rules are
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But as we have repeatedly

seen, there is a distinct, first-person, qualitative
difference between my understanding of, say, English, and the
ability to act as if I understood English by following a rich
syntactic rule book.
The galactic brain thought-experiment and the
discussion on epistemic position have demonstrated the
difference between our attribution of intelligence to systems
for heuristic purposes, and the question of whether a system
is intelligent or not.

This distinction must be kept in mind

when reading the vast array of literature on the Chinese Room
and AI itself.

Koperski

34

NOTES
1

The term 'symbol' is somewhat ambiguous.
One usage is
such that something can only be a symbol if it is viewed as
symbolic of something else.
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To be precise, Searle believes mental terms are not
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Anticipating the outcry from my theistic readers, I
realize I have limited x so that God is likewise not a
candidate for Ix.
Please note that the predicate I is to be
taken in a restricted sense along the lines of intelligentlike-ourselves.
God is certainly intelligent in the common
sense of the term, but he ls not intelligent-like-ourselves.
Thls ls clearly seen ln God's omniscience, which is something
quite different from intelligent-like-ourselves.
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CHAPTER 2
THE FRAME PROBLEM
Within a genet-at.ieoti the pt-oblem of o-eB.tit19 artificial intelligence will be
substantially solved.
Mat-viti Mins~-;.y
Computat.iom Fit1ite am:! It1fit1ite Machines. 1'7.167
The AI pn:•blem is one of the hat-dest science has ever·· undertahen.
Mat-vin
"How Cat1 Cr:•mputet-s ()et Commor1 Sense?" 1982

MitiS~\Y

In Chapter 1 we saw how the rules-and-representations
model of cognition used by GOFAI (good-old-fashioned-A!)
failed to distinguish computer syntax from semantics.

In

this chapter we will examine another problem that has plagued
GOFAI for two decades:

the frame problem (hereafter FP).

Before I say what the problem is, the reader should be
warned about some side issues.

First, there are many

articles in print that show how some writer mistakenly
identifies the "real" FP and then goes on to clear things up.
Unfortunately, these articles do not always agree on what the
real FP is.

I will not try to sort out this confusion nor

will I adopt any one writer's choice of terms.

'FP' here will

represent the most general rubric for several related and
over-lapping topics one of which might be called the frame
problem proper.
Second, the FP is related to but not the same as a
"frame," "script," or "schemata."

These terms, now common in

the AI literature, refer to a programming strategy employed
to help overcome the FP.

This particular strategy will be
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discussed at the end of the chapter.
The FP is a question about the relation of propositions
to one another.

Persons, we observe, make key adjustments to

their noetic web of propositions without being told to do so.
All the sub-topics within the FP, to be discussed in Section
II, relate to the digital computer's inability to either draw
on or properly manipulate propositions the system already
contains.

1

I will not offer a solution to the FP here.

My

goal is to demonstrate a rational ability we have that
computers lack.

This lack emphasizes the gap between man and

machine that strong-A! claims to have bridged.
I. Setting the Stage: Background Knowledge
Before jumping into the subtopics that collectively
make up the FP,
difficulty.

I would like to introduce a related

This information should help the reader gain a

foothold in the discussion.

Perhaps the easiest way to

introduce the problem of background knowledge is with my
favorite illustration by Daniel Dennett, the man perhaps most
responsible for bringing the FP to the attention of the AI
community.

Consider the "snack problem."

I couldt-,'t mahe a sat1dwich without hnowit19 a gcn:uj deal--about
br-ead, spt-eading maymmaise, opet1it19 the fhdge, the fr-iction
at11j inet-tia that will heep U1e tw-key between the bt-ead slices
a.nd the bt-ea.d •:.r-, the plate as I .:an-y the plate over- the table
beside my easy cha.it-. . . . I listed a few of the ver-y many
humdr-um facts one needs to ~mow to solve the snad'. pr-oblem,
but I didn't mean to suggest that those facts at-e stor-ed it1
me--ot- it1 2J"1)' a.gent--piecemeal, in the fc·t-m of a lor19 list of
sentet1ces e>::plkit.ly decl?-rir,g each of these facts for- t.t1e
benefit of the .:;..gent. • . • We tmow tr-illions of thit1gs; we fmow
that mayonnaise doesn't dissolve kr·d.ves ot1 cm1tact, that a
slice of bt-ea.d is smaller- than Mount E'·!et-est.. that opening the
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r-efr-iget-atc.t- doesn't. cause a nudeat- holoca.ust. in the
f\itchen. 2

Rational agents have the ability to form, not just call up
from memory, the specific propositions required to solve
everyday problems.

As Dennett points out, there are many

propositions that we "know" but do not directly consider as
we go about our day.
The problem of background knowledge arises due to the
program requirements of serial computers. 3

To solve any

problem, a computer must be given a data base of all
propositions needed to solve that problem (i.e., the initial
conditions) plus instructions about how these propositions
relate.

The difficulty lies in programming the computer to

use its data base appropriately.
'appropriate'

is quite vague.

Of course, the notion of

Somehow we draw on our

experience to make inferences that relate to our present
situation.

A computer must be instructed (i.e., programmed)

to make similar right inferences--"right" being another illdefined notion in this context.
One major difficulty in this project is that we are not
sure ourselves what principles we use to learn from
experience.

Margaret Boden, a prominent AI writer-

philosopher, believes that in all human reasoning there are
unformalized "integrative principles of tacit inference or
global knowledge of which one is not introspectively aware." 4
Although the nature of these principles is of great interest,
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we do not need to fully understand how we use our experience
to in fact make use of it.
This pragmatic use-it-without-understanding-it approach
is fine for humans.

Nonetheless, whatever these principles

are that we take advantage of, computers do not have them-thus the problem.

Once again, all initial conditions plus

the principles of inference between propositions must be
provided for the computer.

Since we do not know ourselves

how we in fact make use of experience, it is no surprise that
formalizing this ability into computer code is a formidable
task..
How past experience affects future events is of course
not a new puzzle.

The problem of induction remains unsolved

with no solution on the horizon.

The background knowledge

problem might simply be a byproduct of the problem of
induction, but, as Dennett rightly points out, the FP as a
whole will remain even if induction is resolved.
back. to this later.

I will come

Let's now move on to a variety of topics

that all claim to be at least part of the FP.
II. The Frame Problem(s)
The FP in its broad sense is a computer's inability to
"know" how any single piece of information affects the rest
of a data base.

Let's say for simplicity's sake that a data

base, at a certain level of description, contains
propositions.

When a programmer inputs a new proposition,

how does a computer determine which other propositions are
\
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There is currently no way to determine which

specific propositions are to be changed without an exhaustive
search of the data base.

Such a search, however,

is highly

inefficient and not computationally practical given the time
restraints we put on intelligence (i.e., systems that take
days to solve simple problems are not considered candidates
for intelligence even by strong-A!).
To illustrate, say I have a large stack of index cards,
with one sentence per card, that collectively explains the
United States strategy for arms negotiations with the Soviet
Union.

Intelligence sources then report that the Soviets

have secretly withdrawn all troops from Poland.

This new

information will require a revision in some of the sentences
on my index cards, but how many and which ones?

The only way

to know is to look through them all.
Dennett sees the FP not as a technical hurdle for AI,
but a general epistemic question:

How does any cognitive

creature know which conceptual propositions need to be
updated to keep one's internal model "roughly faithful to the
world."~

I will of course limit the discussion to the AI

realm and not explore the larger epistemic question.
For the most part, this section will only present the
difficulties for AI.

How programmers do in fact circumvent

(or at least minimize) the FP will be dealt with in Section
III.

Let's now examine the components of this large problem.
A. Data Retrieval.

Assuming that all the requisite
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facts for solving a given range of questions are provided in
a data base, how does a computer get to these facts to make
use of them?

Well-known AI critic Hubert Dreyfus explains,

To establish that a fact e::dsts in its data banhs a. cc.mputetmust. n?t.heve it. Wor-se.• to establish that. some fact is not iti
the data bank r-equit-es e::·::amitiing the ent.it-e list of what the
computer- ~mows to detennitie that 1::.t1e fact in questim1 is
missing. 6

In contrast, Dreyfus cites Richard Shaffer's example of our
(usually) direct access to our knowledge.

7

I know immedi-

ately when I was born and with some thought I can recall when
my mother was born.

I know immediately that I do not know

when Thomas Jefferson was born and no amount of thinking will
retrieve that information.

I know that I do not know it.

In

a computer, only an exhaustive search can reveal the absence
of any fact.
If the reader does not think exhaustive searching is
much of a hindrance, especially with the speeds at which
modern computers operate, consider that the world's best
chess playing system, Carnegie-Mellon's "Deep Thought," can
calculate 750,000 positions per second.

By 1992, the rate

should exceed one billion positions per second.e

For the

system to calculate the best move in any given situation, an
exhaustive search of all possible counter-moves and countercounter-moves, etc., would have to be made.

However,

it is

estimated that there are 10 1 2 0 different possible games of
chess.

Even if Deep Thought could calculate a billion games

per second, an exhaustive search would take over 100 trillion
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How is it that the

chess program on my PC thrashes me in much less time?
The answer is that programmers are well aware of
algorithms for more efficient data base searching.
method is the use of heuristics.

One such

Heuristic rules are short-

cuts or rules-of-thumb that people often use in decision
making.

For example,

in chess I use rules-of-thumb like

"don't sacrifice a bishop to capture a knight."

Rules like

this are a common programming tool to help cut down
computation time.
There are two major problems with the heuristic
solution.

First, the approach makes the problem less

noticeable but fails to solve it.
that is both accurate and fast,
required.

For a data base search

very specific heuristics are

Such rules are often hard to specify when the data

becomes overly large and complex.
more problematic:

The second objection is

the rules don't always apply.

As any

chess player knows, sometimes you have to sacrifice the
bishop.

The second is a more formidable problem since the

computer has no way of determining when such rule breaking is
allowed unless there is yet another rule to tell it to do so.
That is, the system would need second order heuristics for
breaking first order heuristics, and so on.

A point of

diminishing returns develops such that the time spent
searching for applicable rules sacrifices the time saved by
employing heuristics in the first place.
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To digress for a moment, this need for rule breaking
points to what some call the hard/soft paradox of AI.•

Some

human reasoning appears to be rule-governed (e.g., logic,
grammar, etc.).

The computer's algorithmic ("hard") rules

are perfectly suited to simulate such thinking.

Hard rules

cannot be violated except by the instruction of another hard
rule.
In everyday situations, however, we find many instances
where rules are appropriately broken.
not throw cold water on your wife."

Consider the rule "do
This rule should

immediately be broken if my wife's hair catches fire.

The

"soft" side of human reasoning is the ability to intuit
circumstances that call for extreme or unusual action.

In

these cases, the computer's algorithmic rules become a
hindrance.
I can think of few rules of behavior that persons
should not violate under

~condition.

I do not believe,

however, that I have a ready made criteria for identifying
the circumstances under which such rule breaking is required.
Such decisions must often be made "on the spot."

This need

for adaptability is a notorious problem for AI.
In sum, although programming techniques such as
heuristic rules lessen the data retrieval problem, no method
thus far has solved it.

There appears to be a profound

difference between men and digital computers regarding memory
itself and the relation between memory and behavior.
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Perhaps the key difficulty in the

FP is determining the relevancy of facts.

That is, given the

vast number of facts available to make any single decision,
how can a computer choose the relevant ones and ignore the
rest?
Consider again my stack. of index cards on arms
negotiations.

Someone asks "if the Soviets destroy half of

their ICBM's, how many cruise missiles can we give up?"

I

would like to consider only those cards that have to do with
cruise missiles, but I don't know which ones they are until I
search through the whole stack. skimming for the word
"cruise."

Furthermore, there may be some cards that do not

have "cruise" on them, but are relevant to the question.

How

do I get to these without wading through the entire stack
again?

It appears that the exhaustive search continues to be

the only way to be sure.
Again heuristic rules can be used to help determine
relevancy.

Consider Haugeland's theoretical computer with an

English language data base that must determine how to
interpret 'the pig is in the pen' . 1 0
multiple uses in English.
'pen'

'Pen' of course has

The computer must determine if

is a place on a farm or a writing instrument.

The

relevant fact for solving the ambiguity is that pigs cannot
fit into a writing instrument.

The problem is, how does the

computer determine the relevant fact in this case has to do
with size?

How does the computer determine the key feature
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in any case?
A possible solution to the Haugeland example is that
"in" usually has a size implication.

The computer could

solve the ambiguity with the heuristic semantic rule "a
sentence of the form 'x is in y'
than x."

implies that y is larger

The drawback to this solution is twofold.

First,

as the number of semantic rules like this one becomes large,
the computer would need meta-semantic rules to determine
which semantic rules are relevant.

How will the computer

know if any of these rules (semantic, meta-semantic, and so
on) should be broken?

More rules for rule breaking are

Once again, heuristics push the problem back

required .

but do not solve it.
this context.

Second, "in" is itself ambiguous in

This particular semantic rule will not work

for the sentence "The pig is in the photograph."

Other non-

heuristic methods for determining relevant fact will be
presented in the next section.
Before moving on, let me refer back to the problem of
induction.

Following Dennett, let's assume a computer has

somehow overcome the problem and now has perfect inductive
"beliefs."

The computer still suffers from the FP since it

will still have no way of prioritizing this massive array of
beliefs about the future.
future,

Exhaustive knowledge about the

based on past experience, does not insure that such

knowledge will be used effectively.
A walking encyclopedia will walk over- a. cliff, fm- a.ll its
htiowledge of cliffs and t.he effect.s c•f gt-avit.y, unless it. is
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designed it1 such a f.:tshion that it can find the t-ight bits of
hnowledge at the r-iqht: times.• so it can plan its engagements
with the r-eal wor-ld (empt1B.sis mine).11

C. Selective Updating:

The Bookkeeping Problem.

Some

consider the bookkeeping problem to be the key difficulty of
the FP.

Consider a data base of propositions that

collectively form a model of, say, a desk with colored blocks
on it:

Blockworld.

Let the model be output in three

dimensional graphics so everyone can see what Blockworld
looks like.

Blockworld is set up to correspond to a group of

real colored blocks on my desk.
block on my desk on its side,
to the Blockworld model, p

Thus when I turn the blue

I input a new proposition, p,

= 'The blue block is turned on its

side' .
The question is, which other propositions need to be
revised when p is added to keep the model accurate?

Of

course all of the propositions which contain 'blue block'
might need revision and only those need be considered if the
blue block is alone in the middle of the desk.
ten other blocks are stacked on the blue block?

But what if
Now a large

number of spatial propositions need to be revised that do not
contain 'blue block'.
Depending on the overall situation, some propositions
must be updated and others left alone.

Provided that causal

interactions are all part of the model (e.g. moving blue
block causes ten others to fall), the computer must access
each proposition in the model to find if it needs revision.
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But as we saw, exhaustive searches are time consuming and
heuristics alone do not solve the problem.

An efficient

method for selectively updating only the relevant information
is required.

Of course this assumes the relevant facts

problem has already been solved.
Let's now look at some of the programming techniques
used to circumvent the FP.
III. Repairs and Solutions
A. Repairs.

To lessen the effects of the FP, some

applications use the "cheap test." 12

The program contains

commands that exclude irrelevant parts of the data base from
the search.

For example,

in Blockworld there might be a

limiting rule like 'when an object moves, color and size are
not affected' .

The data base could be easily organized so

that propositions about color and size are grouped.

The

program would then "flag" these groups to exclude them from
the search.
Unfortunately, the cheap test is actually a kind of
heuristic and is subject to the drawbacks mentioned earlier.
Furthermore, such limiting rules do not always apply.

If the

objects in Blockworld are ice cubes or clay, for example,
friction will change the shape of the blocks when they are
moved.

By now the reader should see the relationship between

the scope of application and the proportional need for more
(perhaps second order) rules.
Another programming technique is the "sleeping dog"
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The program is instructed to leave all

propositions alone unless there is some positive reason to
revise them.

That is, when a new proposition is introduced,

the program assumes that without sufficient warrant or
computational relevance nothing else in the data base is
affected.
The glaring difficulty with using the sleeping dog
approach in any general application is how to specify
"sufficient warrant" or "computational relevance."

Defining

these terms and then encoding them for the computer

~

FP!

the

I do not mean to imply that either the cheap test or the

sleeping dog approach are useless.

They are quite sufficient

for dealing with a variety of applications.

The criticisms

here are intended to show that neither is able to solve the
FP for very general or complex applications.
As Dennett has pointed out, there appears to be another
inherent problem with all such relevancy tests.

14

The goal

is to make the system limit its focus to only certain (i.e.,
"relevant") inferences.

The two approaches mentioned add a

relevancy axiom to cut down on the calculated inferences.
Dennett points out, however, that in any (monotonic)
deductive system, the addition of an axiom never reduces the
number of inferences available,

it always increases them.

Otherwise, the new axiom must be inconsistent with a previous
one.
For example, consider a closed deductive system with
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Let's say that there are twenty proofs

calculable from these axioms.

Now add a sixth axiom.

If

Axiom 6 makes any of the previous twenty proofs invalid,
is inconsistent with one of the first five axioms.

it

Say Axiom

6 is consistent with the first five and is a relevancy test
which is supposed to limit the number of inferences.

Instead

of limiting steps, the program will calculate all the same
inferences (the twenty proofs) plus calculate their relevancy
(i.e., solve the proofs that follow from the addition of
Axiom 6, the relevancy test).
What we really want is for the system to ignore
irrelevant data, not calculate that the data is irrelevant
and then ignore it.

No one wants a computer to waste

valuable computation time calculating all of the propositions
that it can ignore.
B. Scripts: A REAL solution?

The most successful

solution to the FP to date is the use of "scripts" (Schank),
"frames" (Minsky), and "schemata" (Rumelhart).
unfamiliar with field,

For those

the difference is negligible.

dissimilarity lies in the degree of a program's
"anticipation."

Here are the computer scientists' own

explanations of this approach:
A ft-ame is a dat.a-st.ntct.ut-e fc·t- n:pn::1sent.ing a
sten:ot.yped situation.• like being in a cet-t.ait·• hit1d .:.f living
t-oom, Ot- g.:.ing to a. child's bit-t.hday p.:tr-t.y. Att.act1ed t..:. each
fn:u1ie at-e sever-al hinds of infm-mat.ion. !::orne r:•f this
infor-mation is about how to use the ft-ame. Some is abr:•ut what
one can e:=·=:pect to happen ne::-=:t.. Some is about what to do if
these e::·::pectat.ions ;:.re not confir-med. . • • t'luch of the
phenomer·1ological pO'ol/er- of the theor-y hinges on the inclusion .:.f
t1im;~.;y:

The
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::;chanf'.i We define a scdpt as a. pt-edetet-mined causal chait1 of
conceptualizations t.ha.t. descdbe the r:m-mal sequence of things
in a fa.miliar- situatiotl. Tt1us thet-e is a. t-estaw-a.nt. scr-ipt, a
bit-thday-pat-t.y schpt, a football game scr-ipt., a dassn:u:om
SCI·-ipt._, atld SO Oti.16

The ability-to-ignore, lack.ing in other techniques,

is not

attained through the addition of a new IGNORE-algorithm in
the program.

Instead the system's attention is focused by

the stereotypical expectations of the script.
This anticipatory behavior of a script roughly
simulates our own day-to-day interactions.

When someone

enters a familiar situation, lik.e Schank.'s football game
script, he has certain expectations and customary actions
that help him to socially negotiate the activity.

If he

encounters something highly unusual, say his chili-dog bursts
into a chorus of "God Save the Queen," it tak.es time to sort
out what's going on and what the appropriate reactions might
be.
Similarly a robot running scripted software has no
difficulties within the preprogrammed expectations.
when the robot's encounters fit the script,

That is,

its reactions are

easily accessed by the program thus circumventing exhaustive
searches, relevancy tests, etc.

Abnormal encounters tak.e

longer to deal with, not unlik.e reactions in persons.
There are some usual questions a GOFAI critique ask.s at
this point.
adaptability:

The first of which usually involves
Does the script technique allow for a wide
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When things proceed as usual, the

computer's script can deal with most problems and has an
acceptable range of adaptability.

I will not defend this

assertion except to say computer scientists would not
continue to pursue such a research program without limited
success.

When things come "out of the blue" however, like

the aberrant chili-dog, the computer's reactions are often
not foreseen nor acceptable.
A more severe problem is related to the relevancy test.
Not only do persons determine which facts are relevant in a
given scenario, but they also assign different degrees of
relevancy to them.

We are able to adapt to different "levels

of weirdness" as John Searle puts it.

But even scripted

software is not able to prioritize its expectations to suit
different situations.

For example,

in Schank's restaurant

script, "it is equally 'weird' for the restaurant to be out
of food as it is for the customer to respond by devouring the
chef." 1 e

The singing chili-dog is just as strange in the

football script as kicking a seventy yard field goal.
How is it that we recognize degrees of weirdness?

At

least part of the answer is that we are not isolated to facts
within a given script; we have access to other facts about
cultural norms and interpersonal relations.

For example, a

woman without a top walking on a beach is highly irregular
(i.e., the situation, not the woman) in America but not in
France.

An isolated group of "beach facts" cannot be
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assigned degrees of abnormality without knowledge of cultural
norms.

Notice how the relevancy test, degrees of relevancy,

and background knowledge problems all come into play here.
Given these problems with the script technique, why has
it been such a successful research program?
ironically yields another criticism:
available within each

script.

1

~

The answer

there is an ad hoc fix

As a programmer debugs a

given script, he usually stumbles onto the abnormalities that
go beyond the software's ability to adapt.

At these specific

points, a direct contingency command is implanted to prevent
the system from "locking up" or doing whatever undesired
activity it tends to fall into when confronted with aberrant
data.

Individual scripts can always be saved in this way.
For example, consider a simple algebraic computer

program written in BASIC in which some variable A is used in
several equations.
CB+C)/A'.

One of the lines of the program is '500

The programmer notices that if the variable A is

zero, then line 500 will generate an error message:
by zero is algebraically undefined.

division

To circumvent this

problem, the programmer can put in a line '490 If A=O, then
550' which instructs the program to skip over line 500 and
execute line 550 if A is zero.

This strategy is a perfectly

acceptable ad hoc fix for preventing division by zero, but it
is obviously restricted to this problem.
Unfortunately, ad hoc solutions are not sufficient to
solve the FP in general.

Scripts are a useful approach for
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solving specific problems but this strategy cannot overcome
the digital computer's chronic lack of adaptability.
Scripted software was hoped to be the key to solving a
host of GOFAI puzzles.

In the early 80's it became evident

that current scripts were not performing as expected and some
of the strong-A! rhetoric started to be toned down.

For

example, compare Minsky's 1967 quote at the beginning of the
chapter with this one from 1981:
.Just cm·,st.r-u.ct.irlg a hnowledge base is a ma..jot- it",tellect.ual
r-esean=h pr-oblem. • • • We still ~-:.r·,c·w fat- too little about the
cc•ntents and st.t-uctur-e of common-setlse knowled;:1e. f.. 'mitlimal'
commm1-set1se system must '~mow' something about ca.use-andeffect, time, puq::.ose, locality, pt-ocess, a.nd types of
~\t1owledge= =

:s

r.

We tieed a ser-ious epist.emola:,gical t-esear-,=h

effm-t iti this at-ea.20

Let's assume that scripts in the future will overcome
all the aspects of the FP mentioned so far.

There appear to

be two more problems on the horizon that affect this
approach.
IV. Future Hurdles
A. The Folding Problem.

Assume for the moment that

humans work from something like scripts.

As I sit here in

the midst of my thesis-script, say I come to a sticking
point-~!

problem.

just don't know how to work out some conceptual
But I recall from my history-class-script that in

World War II the Americans,

in order to liberate others,

initially bypassed well fortified islands held by the
Japanese.

I take the "principle" (an admittedly ill defined

notion that I will not shore up here) of temporarily
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bypassing difficult obstacles and apply it within my thesisscript by moving on to the next topic.
terminology,
scripts.

In script

I have folded information from two unrelated

Programming a computer to do likewise is the heart

of the "folding problem."
Within the limited universe of a given script, some AI
programs adapt well to new information and can generally
limit the crunch of the FP.

Some Aiers believe that when

enough powerful scripts are loaded into one computer,

it will

behave intelligently in all script-scenarios and therefore,
under GOFAI, will be intelligent.
The folding problem is simply this:

computers do not

channel general principles between isolated scripts.

As my

previous illustration shows, we are able to learn from a
given situation and apply our knowledge to new unrelated
settings.

All inferential ties between software scripts,

in

contrast, must be determined in advance.
Furthermore, there are also instances when whole,
unrelated scripts need to be integrated.

Assuming persons

rely on a restaurant-script and a birthday-party-script, we
can easily fold these two scripts together when a birthday
party is held in a restaurant.

Such smooth combinations of

discrete scripts do not just emerge within a program.

To

solve the folding problem, programmers must find a way to tie
together the conceptual archipelago of multiple scripts.
B. The Jumping Problem.

Closely related to the folding
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problem, the jumping problem is the computer's inability to
make a smooth transition between scripts.
For example, say you are eating lunch at the Western
Steer (i.e., are in the middle of your restaurant-script)
when your colleague, who has illegally made his third trip to
the one-time-only salad bar, begins choking on a tomato.

You

must immediately transition from your restaurant-script to a
choking-script to save his life.

An observing computer

meandering through its restaurant-script has no ready made
way of jumping to another.

Inference bridges would have to

be provided in advance between all possibly connected
scripts--obviously demanding a great deal of foresight on the
part of the programmer.
Scripts are unquestionably useful within a well defined
scenario.

The folding and jumping problems show, however,

that daily cognitive activities require interaction between
normal, stereotypical situations.

In the next section I will

examine some criticisms directed at the FP itself.

That is,

some claim the FP is a pseudo-problem.
V. A Real Problem?
The most outspoken antagonist of the FP is Drew
McDermott.

His criticism is three-pronged.

21

First, the

above mentioned sleeping dog method has been a sufficient
programming technique for most of the last fifteen years.
is so successful,

It

in fact, that no one in the field is even

working on a solution to this mythical FP!

Second, regarding
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intelligence, we do not make the same demands of perfection
on humans that the FP imposes on computers.

That is, humans

cannot take all relevant information into account when such
facts become numerous.

Information overload is a problem for

all cognitive beings, not just computers.

Third, the

philosopher-critics ("framist") who push the FP are a moving
target.

Once Aiers begin to answer the real FP, framists

shift to other "related" problems that are themselves able to
be overcome.
Patrick Hayes,

in the article right after McDermott's

in one anthology, responds to McDermott's challenge.
The ft-ame pr-oblem is sometimes dismissed 2.s being a natTow,
I think
t.echnica.l pt-oblem of little pfiilosetphical inter-est.
this is a. mista.he. For- one thir1g, a. 'nan-ow technical problem'
which is this immediate., this centt-al, this devasta.ting.. and this
t-esist.ant. to solution is wot-t.hy of some r-espect.~22

Why isn't anyone working on the FP?

Because, as I pointed

out earlier, for each script under consideration, there is
always an ad hoc fix that takes care of that and only that
script.

Whatever this fix may be,

it generally is not

applicable to another s.cript.
The overload problem in McDermott's second prong is for
the most part correct.

Although he fails to consider our

abilities to prioritize incoming information based on
experience, McDermott rightly points out that GOFAI critics
should not demand that a computer surpass man's cognitive
abilities.

All finite beings can consider only a finite

number of propositions at one time and are thus subject to
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McDermott's point is granted, but

unfortunately for GOFAI, the FP is more than just a breakdown
of information management.
Another reason for taking the FP seriously, albeit a
somewhat anecdotal one,

is that it appears to be at the heart

of the "conversion" of one of GOFAI's key workers, Terry
Winograd.

According to Dreyfus, Winograd now teaches

Heidegger to his computer science students at Stanford to
help show the difficulties of formalizing background
knowledge and making scripts interact. 2 3

The point is,

McDermott is simply wrong when he claims that computer
scientists do not feel the tension of the FP.

Winograd is

the most visible strong-A! "defector" to date.
VI. Conclusion
How does this chapter support my overall case against
strong-A!?

I believe the problem helps show that human

knowers are different from (at least digital) computers in
kind, not simply in degree of complexity.

The rational,

human ability to make key changes to one's noetic web without
rules or instructions on how to make such changes is not
shared by program driven systems.

The FP shows that simply

having more powerful programs/rules does not eliminate the
problem.

This unique rational ability is evidence that men

are more that very fast, very powerful, and very complex
rule-governed machines.

As long as this man-machine gap

remains in place, the claims of strong-A! will retain their
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status as optimistic exaggerations.
To conclude,

I would like to digress into epistemology

proper for a moment.

In most epistemic models, except very

pure forms of coherence justification, philosophers realize
that some beliefs play a more significant role in our noetic
structure than others.

These "weightier" beliefs support the

lesser ones or at least require a greater amount of evidence
before they may be revised.

How beliefs relate to and rely

on one another is a subject of great debate (e.g., what is it
for one proposition to be evidence for another?).

Under-

standing the nature of this relation is not required for
persons to,

in fact, hold and prioritize their beliefs.

This lack of knowledge about knowledge will not do for
GOFAI.

Programmers must guess how inference, evidence, and

even induction work and then go on to formalize these opaque
notions.

In this light,

it is little wonder why

philosopher's often view GOFAI claims with skepticism.
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CHAPTER 3
THE OVERSEER PROBLEM

nor!numE:i·-'icEd.:
int.e11e.::t.u.~:J

Any attempt t.c l~:w;or-e. thj.s is hi·::ihl>. . unsci~::ntific:: In
.::q)pr-·()a.c:h_IJ ct·le acce.lpt.:3 t.hi:; f~ict. Etnd copes :~lith it=

t!·~1e

t.r·u.e

cf Aut.om.::rt..~.:: 1'?-62

The conceptual difficulties discussed in the last two
chapters usually involve serial digital computers.

On the

cutting edge of computer technology lies another architecture
that may very well overcome both the challenge of the Chinese
Room and the Frame Problem.

The programmes are often called

connectionism, parallel distributed processing (PDP), neural
networks, and massively parallel systems, although these
names are not fully synonymous.

There is unfortunately no

space here to provide an adequate overview of this new
approach, however, there are a handful of introductory
articles available.

1

In this chapter I will present another problem for
strong-AI that affects both conventional computers and PDP.
I must ask the reader to assume that what I attribute to PDP
is correct and not open for discussion at this point.

The

purpose here is not to quibble about what PDP does or how it
accomplishes its tasks;

I will simply grant most of the

claims made by computer scientists in this young field.

I

will then go on to show that neither digital computers nor
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PDP's escape what I call the Overseer Problem COP).
I. Connectionism: The New Frontier
Recall my Blockworld illustration from Chapter 2.

In

short, the computer's program constructs an internal model of
a room with colored blocks.
software: the better the

The key to Blockworld is the

progt~am_.

the better the model.

contrast, PDP does not use a progr-am.

In

Instead the system is

trained (invoking the anthropomorphic qualifier one last
time) through examples.

That is, the system develops its own

generalizations and internal representations from particular
examples without algorithmic instructions on how this
representation is to be constructed.
For example,

let's say a given neural net receives

input from a video camera that is pointed at various live
dogs.

After a large number of sample-dogs has been given to

the net, the system will form an internal representation of a
paradigm-dog.

Once trained (not programmed) the net can

distinguish dogs from other objects.

Giving a sophisticated

net a great deal of training should allow it to distinguish
dogs from cats, cows, and perhaps even from statues of dogs.
For the reader whose knowledge of computers is limited
to the digital variety,

it might be difficult at first to

appreciate the tremendous difference between a conventional
and a non-programmable system.

The key is that no program

means no rules; PDP rejects the RR theory of cognition.
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e::-::plicit. i·-t.tJ.es,. l:;~c~.t.her-·.:z \~e .::tssume i:t. is the .::r.cquisitton of
connection str-·t:::ngt.hs '::•.ihic!···! .:::.llo¥.1 a net1.::Jot·-~\~ of simple ux1it.::~ to

PDP might offer a way around the Chinese Room since,
without a program, there is no (prescriptive) syntax.

3

Few

are claiming that neural nets are sophisticated enough to
"understand" a natural language; however, the syntaxsemantics distinction that the Chinese Room relies on is
harder to define when there is no program.

As for the Frame

Problem, PDP memory is not stored in data-bases but rather
throughout the net (cf. holographic images).
that I cannot explore here,

For· rea sons

such content-based memory makes

the relevant facts issue much less of a problem.

Whether PDP

can solve the Frame Problem or the Chinese Room must wait for
another time.

Let's now examine the problem PDP does not

escape.
II. The Overseer Problem
In short, the OP is the inability of artificial systems
to perform independently, that is, without the prior
assistance of an intelligent agent to set the parameters of
the system's task and to determine when that task is to be
considered correct or

complete.~'

The task-determination part

is somewhat trivial.

Humans, after all, usually design

artifacts for the purpose of carrying out specific tasks.
Task-completion and validation, knowing when the job is done
correctly,

is another matter.
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How does PDP come to know a

What is the "right" answer to a

problem for a system that has just been activated,
lacking any data to work with?

initially

Let's begin with a

theoretical neural net in action.
Consider a net designed to distinguish kinds of cars by
color and manufacturer.

First, the net must be "trained up"

from examples of cars.

To do this, the system is attached to

a video camera in a parking lot.

For training, the camera

first must be pointed at a car and then the net makes a
random guess of color and manufacturer.

Actually, at this

early stage the net does not have an internal representation
of 'color' or 'manufacturer'; the guess is a true shot-inthe-dark..

The net's trainer inputs a new signal that either

reinforces the current internal representation,

in the case

of a correct guess, or alters the representation,
of a wrong guess.

in the case

After a large number of examples and

correction signals, the net is trained.

That is, the system

has developed a paradigm model for each color and each
manufacturer, respectively.

Now the camera can point to any

car and the net will determine the make and color.
The key to the OP is the role of the trainer.

Of

course, the trainer must determine the nature of the problem
to be solved.

More importantly, the trainer already has

knowledge of what constitutes a right or wrong response from
the neural net.

From the net's point of view, as it were,
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The net has no

objective reference for determining correct results except by
the feedback of the trainer.
For some readers, this analysis may be a matter of
highlighting the obvious.
strong-AI,

If so, recall the claims of

such as the opening quote of the introduction:

"We are about to conceive of the knower as a computing
machine."

The thrust of the OP is that "the knower," if he

is to be given equal cognitive status to human agents, must
be able to function without an overseer to specify tasks and
predetermine the nature of correct responses.

Although I

have found little attention given to this problem, here are a
couple of notable quotes:
Ou.r- licen:::;e t.o
depe~rtd:3

upor1

spe:~ak

of these systems as

t~···!e fc~c:t. t.l···~~:::y

.ju.dgin~3 simil.2J·~·it.y

clas:stfy together-

p~.:::t.t.er-ns

t.l·13.t wc:

(empha.::;i:::: m:Lne):: 5
The pi·-cb:tern •--··-j' !t·=r t::

cer-tain

genei·-B.liz]Yi'j in wa:;'s t.hctt. ai·~·e .:;;.ppl·-cpr-j.cft.e! t.c: a cont.e::-::t=
des~v:::Jnet- !-:.::.ostr-icts the net. t.o -=~ pr-ed:::.;fined cl3.S:"5 of
appr-cjpr-·tat.e r-esponse::-5.=: the 1·1et. :#ill be e::-::hibit.ir-~~::i the
¥=~ill

.!.. ;_ -·

!_.rit.:

t·-tot. have the common senst: that. wouJ.d en21.ble it. to .::=.dE.=.pt.

tc ct.ht::r- c:orrte::-::t.s_;

.?..:"3

r.:1

tr·u.ly humdx·! intelligence wou1::J= 6

B. The Overseer and GOFAI.
GOFAI.

lT

The OP looms larger for

In PDP, the system only needs to be fed "right"

examples.

Likewise in programmed digital computers, correct

data must be input (recall the programmer's cliche "garbage
in, garbage out").

Furthermore, the entire structure of the
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computer's task must be defined in detail in the body of the
pr·ogram.

Right and wrong are,

in a manner of speaking,

in

the eyes of the beholder--in this case the person writing the
sofb.;are code.

The OP here is quite stark.

The computer

does nothing without an overseer-programmer to define a) the
problem, b) the nature of correct answers, and c) a detailed
algorithm for how the problem is to be addressed.
requirement,

The last

(c), makes the OP stronger for GOFAI than for

PDP since, once again, the latter has no program.
C. Obiection: PDP Can Overcome OP.

The unique

abilities of PDP might offer a way to overcome the OP.

There

is, the objection runs, no need for a program and therefore
no need for a programmer-overseer.

Inherent in the PDP

architecture is a
e>=:t.t'"act.in~:~ r-egul2.r-ities fr·-oin
ensernble of ir·!pu.ts without the .::d.d cf sophistic:e..t.e.d

···./er-y simple mech.:::.nism for·38t"ier-.::tliza.t.J.cn or·

r-,_J:h:::·-for"·mul.~ting

-:::u·~

n1echc:.r-d.sms t.ha.t c:.:\;er-::::ee the.:

ar-e cornpleteJy loc2-.l.~ in the sense tha.t. t!·-1ey char-,~je t.he
cor1necti(',:;n bt=::tween one u.nit 2-.nd anot.t···!et"- en t.he bc:.s1.:3 of

i=•e.r.:f::;.:r:=.Ol?.:!~.!:;&.:t
vie·~·

T!··1e model thus st.a.nds .:::.s c.xt d.lter···nat.ive t() the
that. led.t-ning in C0'3r-dti . ./e s:::lst.~.:::m::::: :in\lOl\/es the '::.s>::plicit.
.!..1--

=-·f!t:

guida.nce of"

Unlike a programmed computer, neural nets form
conceptual representations apart from any guidance on how
this formation is to be done.

For example, our own

conceptual schemes intended to represent the physical world
rely heavily on our five senses.

The distinguishing features
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of objects are often given in terms of shape, color, size,
texture, etc.
In contrast, consider another theoretical neural net
that distinguishes trees from telephone poles.

This net's

input consists of a TV camera, audio microphone, radar, and
infrared detector.

With this array of choices from which the

net will build its paradigm-tree and paradigm-telephone-pole,
we have no idea nor control over what "sensory" input the net
will decide is significant.

The net's determination of

significance and its internal representation are completely
unknown to any programmer-overseer.

In Kantian terms, we do

not know what categories the net will develop to distinguish
the two kinds of objects.
Anyone who fully understands the OP will see that this
attempt to escape the problem will not do.

First, an

overseer is required to define a problem for the net to
solve.

Second, even without an algorithm for solving the

tree-pole problem, the neural net still requires an overseer
to say whether the output during training is right or wrong.
Without this feedback,
Third,

the net cannot build its paradigms.

the net's ability to make generalizations can only be

exercised if it is given the correct exemplars on which to
base its model.

Three trees may be sufficient to give the

net some prototype of 'tree,' but what if the trainer
mistakenly inputs a bush?

Then the paradigm is distorted and

the net's performance is diminished.

In this way the
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accuracy of the net's future performance is wholly dependent
on being properly trained, where "proper·" 1 s once aga 1 n in
the eyes of the overseer.
I I I.

Induct ion
At this point,

action.

I would like to demonstrate the OP in

The problem of induction has stubbornly refused to

succumb since the time of Hume and, with Goodman's help,
has actually intensified.

it

Let's see how the problem of

induction CPI) and the overseer problem jointly pose a
conceptual snare for strong-AI.
We want computers to make the "right" inferences based
on experience.
inferences.

Then again, we hope to make similar right

When are we justified in going from "x 13's have

all been found to be y" to "all 13's are y" or even "it is
probable that the next 13 I observe will be y"?
observations are required?

How many

Since the PI is still unsolved,

we can only observe that we do in fact make judgments about
the future based on past experience.
How does a computer solve the PI?
works out the solution in advance.

Answer: An overseer

To illustrate, recall

fr·om Chapter 2 the "script" technique in programming.
Stereotypical situations (e.g.,

the restaurant script, the

ball game script) are given to the computer as guidelines to
operate within.

However,

to describe a given situation as

"stereotypical" implies that we already know what
regularities are to be expected in the future in such a
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This simply ignores the PI, as we almost always do

in our day-to-day routines.

A scripted program is a safety

net provided by the overseer to insure that the system makes
the "right" inferences.

Thus the system never faces real

induction.
Although things are better for PDP, the overseer is
often presupposed in induction problems.

For instance, from

a given number of exemplars the net will establish that "all
Trans Ams have been Pontiacs" and thus "the next Trans Am
examined will be a Pontiac."

However,

if the goal of the

training is to get the net to form this "belief," obviously
the overseer must have been satisfied in advance that this
be 1 i e f

is true .
I should point out that part of the power of PDP is its

ability to make inferences and detect patterns not found by
humans looking at the same data.

For example, banks and

insurance companies currently use neural net simulations to
detect financial patterns that will help determine loan
applications, etc.

In some respects, neural nets are better

at induction than we are.

The reason this ability is

insufficient to solve the OF lies in the training.

For any

net to make inferences, an overseer is still required to
train the net with examples that the overseer already knows
to be "correct" inductive inferences.
To conclude the discussion on the PI,

I would like to

address a conceptual issue arising from differences in

Koperski
education.

71

One reason Aiers do not wrestle with induction

the way philosophers do is because engineers, mathematicians,
and computer scientists approach the subject through
probability theory.

An informal yet philosophically

significant part of probability theory is what I will call
the all-things-being-equal wand.
To illustrate,

8

I recall my introduction to probability

theory in a communications class.

The professor would always

talk about the probability of a given event "all-thingsbeing-equal."

An example would be, "The probability of this

coin coming up heads when flipped is 0.5, all-things-beingequal."

We understood that this qualifier meant we could

ignore the probability of a bird diving through the window
and snatching the coin or the probability of the coin
spontaneously decomposing.

For all such instances, the

professor would always wave the all-things-being-equal wand
to eliminate unwanted factors.
Returning to AI, without an overseer providing the allthings-being-equal wand for the computer, the system has no
way of "just knowing" what factors can legitimately be ruled
out.

Somehow all of the students in my communications class

understood what factors were eliminated by "all-things-beingequa 1."

Unless computers can develop a similar ab i 1 it y .• the

overseer will not fade into irrelevance.

And unless the

overseer fades into irrelevance, strong-AI claims will
continue to be exaggerated.
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IV. Thesis Conclusion
There is a danger in criticizing AI that I have tried
to avoid in this work.

Too often critics point to what

computers currently fail to do without a view toward
advancing technology.

This tactic is a trap:

Picking at the

difficult technological barriers and hardware-software
limitations faced by AI today will inevitably backfire.
For example, digital computers have had a longstanding
difficulty in processing and recognizing images.

Given

sufficient computing time, most systems could be programmed
to recognize faces;

however, we have the ability to recognize

a given face almost immediately.

For years critics like

Hubert Dreyfus have cited "elementary" perceptual mistakes
made by computers that the average child could avoid.
computer image processing is quite advanced.

Today,

Consider the

accuracy of Tomahawk cruise missiles used in the Gulf War.
With the help of a maturing technology in charge-coupled
devices, many of Dreyfus' early criticisms about computer
perception have now been met.
Have I avoided this trap?

I'm not sure.

Unless

digital computer technology gives way to PDP, the Chinese
Room will retain its force (see note 3).

The Frame Problem

may very well be solved or at least made much less noticeable
in time and I do not claim that it is an insurmountable
difficulty.

The Overseer Problem, however,

is highly

conceptual and will not likely fall in the wake of new
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If I have left myself vulnerable to the trap,

so

be it.
What has been accomplished in this thesis?
simply recapping my arguments from Chapters 1-3,
to address strong-AI in general.

Instead of
I would lik.e

The three chapters

individually raise questions that must be answered before
Aiers can claim that computers are intelligent.

I do not

mean that AI research should come to a stop until computer
scientists can appease every philosophical nemesis.

However,

I do think. these concerns must be addressed before Aiers
continue to lob conceptual bombs into metaphysics, the
philosophy of language, and particularly the philosophy of
mind.
What has not been accomplished in this thesis?

I have

not developed criteria for intelligence that clearly
demarcate man from machine.

Such criteria would draw the

discussion far afield and would need to consider the problem
of other minds and perhaps Wittgenstein's private language
argument, especially where the overseer/trainer is involved.
My goal was the lesser task. of tightening the reins on some
in the AI community.

AI has unquestionably helped in the

development of the necessary conditions for intelligence.
Strong-AI claims, however,

lead the reader to believe that

computer science has already determined the sufficient
conditions for intelligence.
too optimistic.

This claim,

I have shown,

is
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I urge readers from all disciplines to keep

track of their metaphors.

Every advanced field of study

incorporates rather innocent sounding words into the jargon
of the field.
'sees',

In the case of computer science, words like

'knows', and 'memory' are used to describe computers

because we know what such words mean when applied to people.
We use these words metaphorically, which is perfectly fine.
Too often the metaphor is lost.

Common words with technical

meanings start migrating between fields and then back to
ordinary speech.

It is regrettable when the man-in-the-

street becomes confused by this migration.

When the scholar

and the scientist likewise become confused, entire worldviews may hang in the balance.
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NOTES
~The best two articles available appear in the same
journal.
See John L. Tienson, "An Introduction to
Connectionism," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26,
supplement C1987): 1-16 and Willi am BechteL "Connectionism
and the Philosophy of Mind: An Overview." The Southern
Journal of Philosophy 26, supplement (1987): 17-41.

David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and the PDP
Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations
in the Microstructure of Cognition. Volume 1: Foundations,
(Cambridge: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 1986), 32
2

3

A prescriptive syntax, like a computer program, drives
the system.
Executing a program is synonymous with following
a set of syntactic rules.
Without a program, PDP has no
driving, prescriptive syntax; however, its internal mechanism
may be described syntactically.
Although Searle believes the
Chinese Room is applicable to PDP since there is a syntactic
description available, I believe the Chinese Room fails
unless the syntax is prescriptive.
4
John Searle has mentioned a similar problem to OP
called the "Homunculus Fallacy .•" but so far he has applied it
only to digital computers.
See Searle, "Is the Brain a
Digital Computer?'' APA Proceedings 64 (November 1990): 21-37,
especially pp. 28-29.

"-~'Bechtel,

27.

~"·Dr·eyfus,
Hubert L. , and St uar·t E. Dreyfus, "Making a
Mind Versus Modeling the Brain: Artificial Intelligence Back
at Branchpoint," in The Artificial Intelligence Debate:
False Starts, Real Foundations, ed. Stephen R. Graubard
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 38.

James L. McClelland, David E. Rumelhart, and the PDP
Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations
in the Microstructure of Cognition. Volume 2: Psychological
and Biologi~al Models (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/Bradford
Books, 1986), 214.
7
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